What Can Latin America Learn from China's Labour Market
Reforms? Richard B. Freeman Analysts typically take the labour institutions in advanced countries as defining the ways in which developing economies can organize their labour markets. International agencies often pose the choice as one between a US-style decentralized market-driven system that relies on employers to determine wages and working conditions subject to market pressures with little institutional intervention or collective bargaining; or a European Union (EU)-style system in which industrial or regional unions bargain collectively with employer federations to produce agreements that governments may extend to all firms and workers in the sector. The IMF and World Bank favour US-style labour flexibility.
The ILO favours EU-style bargaining.
In this chapter I argue that developing-country labour markets differ so much from those in advanced countries that developing countries can benefit more from the experience of the labour markets in other developing countries than from the labour markets of the USA and EU. I examine the range and performance of labour institutions among advanced and developing countries. 1
Developing-Country Labour Issues are Different Labour issues in developing economies differ from those in advanced economies in three fundamental ways. First, the informal share of the labour force is far greater in developing countries than in advanced countries. Throughout the developing world, many workers are self-employed, and many work as employees in the informal sector or in informal jobs within the formal sector (see Section 2.2 of Chapter 12). The proportion of workers with non-standard or irregular contracts has increased in advanced countries but most of these workers still have some protections and social insurance and pay charges for those benefits.
non-standard or irregular, including temporary or day workers, contingent workers, and so on, increased from 1996 to 2006 Grubb, Lee, and Tergeist 2007) . Huang (2009: 45) . Cooke (2008: 4) reports that the term 'informal employment', however, is a relatively new concept in China that was first introduced by the labour authority in Shanghai in 1996.
informal-sector employment. Mobility of workers between formal and informal jobs is high in Latin America (Perry et al. 2007 ) and possibly elsewhere, but much of the movement is cyclic. Informal-sector workers move to formal jobs when the economy booms and return to the informal sector when it contracts. Underlying the continued importance of informal-sector work in developing countries is the rapid growth of productivity in manufacturing and industry (where formal-sector work predominates), which limits job growth in those sectors, and the slower growth of productivity in the service industries (where informal-sector work predominates).
With a substantial share of the labour force working outside the formal sector for the foreseeable future, developing countries have to devise new ways to deliver pensions, occupational health and safety protection, unemployment insurance, training, labour rights, and other social services to informal sector workers or face continued bifurcation of their labour markets into a better paid protected formal sector and a lower paid informal sector.
[ Insert Table 13 .1 about here] The second big difference between labour in developing economies and in advanced economies is that developing economies have greater inequality in household income and in labour earnings. Column 1 of China's Gini of 41.5 places it in the middle of the distribution for all countries and below the Ginis of nearly all Latin American countries. Before China began its economic reforms it had the narrow distribution of incomes associated with communist economies.
Market-oriented reforms doubled the Gini in China between 1978 and the 1990s.
Inequality continued to increase into the 2000s . Much of China's rising inequality is associated with urban-rural differentials which trended upwards as economic reform brought market wage-setting to the urban areas. In 2010 the urban-rural income differential reached an all-time high of 3.33 to 1. Viewing Gini coefficients in the Latin American range as dangerous to social stability, the Chinese government has adopted labour market and social policies designed to shift the distribution of income towards lower-wage workers and lower-income families.
The third big difference between labour in developing countries and advanced countries is in the distribution of skills among workers. Most developing-country labour 4 I distinguish between advanced economies and all others, including wealthy Arab oil countries, transition economies, and so on for simplicity. Comparisons are qualitatively similar for more narrowly drawn samples of economies.
forces contain a rapidly growing population of highly educated younger persons in urban areas, a population of less educated older persons, and a large number of young persons in rural areas who drop out of school at an early age. This dualistic structure is far wider than the distribution of education in advanced countries today and wider than the distribution in those countries when they were experiencing their growth spurts. The reason is that from the end of the twentieth century to the 2010s developing countries invested more heavily in higher education and graduated relatively more people with university degrees at an earlier stage of development than countries have ever done before (Freeman 2010, see also Chapter 15) . Table 13 .3 shows data on enrolments and degrees in tertiary institutions in the USA, China, and Latin America in 2007. China had the largest number of students and graduates in the world--enrolling over 25 million students in tertiary education and graduating 5.9 million with bachelor's degrees--the result of expanding mass higher education following the virtual closure of the university system in the Cultural Revolution. US and Latin American undergraduate enrolments were about 75 per cent of Chinese enrolments but the number of US graduates was less than 50 per cent of Chinese graduates and the number of Latin America's graduates was just 37 per cent of Chinese graduates. 5 In addition to enrolling large numbers in domestic colleges and universities, developing countries send an increasing number of students for 5
The gap between graduates and enrolments in the USA results from the high proportion of US students enrolled in community colleges, where many obtain the associate's degree as a final degree. The gap in Latin America reflects the fact that many students take a long time to get their degrees and many also do not complete their education. study in the advanced countries. 6 Relative to population, the Chinese obtain nearly twice as many PhDs in the USA as do Latin Americans.
The large increasing supply of graduates in developing countries gives those countries the capacity to 'leapfrog' to the forefront of modern technology and compete with advanced countries in high-tech sectors which economists once viewed as the comparative advantage preserve of the advanced countries. In the labour market, the increased supply of graduates drives down the wage advantage of educated workers, which reduces inequality. In the case of China, Cai Fang and Wang Meiyan (2010) estimate that between 2003 and 2009 the earnings advantage of starting college graduates in China fell relative to the earnings of migrant workers from 2.25 to 1.65. But a higher share of the work force with university education can also add to inequality by increasing the proportion of workers with above-average wages and, given the above-average levels of within-group inequality among college graduates, by increasing the proportion of workers from a high within-group level of inequality. Perhaps most important, the number of graduates increased so rapidly in China from the 1990s to the 2010s as to create a huge disconnect between the career aspirations and earnings expectations of graduates and employment prospects available to them in an economy with a large informal sector. Since a disconnect among the educated young can readily erupt into social disorder, Chinese leaders gave priority during the great recession to finding jobs for university graduates as well as for the displaced migrant workers. Having substantial numbers of university graduates and less skilled informalsector workers in the same economy requires developing countries to have labour policies that deal not only with the traditional labour-relations issues pertaining to formal-sector industrial workers per advanced country labour law and institutions but also to develop policies for the labour market for university graduates and for informal-sector workers as well.
Labour Institutions
Think-tanks, international agencies, and independent researchers provide measures of the institutional differences among countries in the form of readily available indexes of economic freedom, competitiveness, business climate, etc. 7 The organizations that construct these indexes generally take an ideal competitive market as the benchmark for assessing economies. Thus they treat reliance on market forces as a positive attribute of a labour system and treat collective bargaining and other institutional processes for setting pay or employment as a negative attribute. The indexes put countries whose institutions resemble those of the USA and other Anglo-American economies (Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes 2007) above countries with EU-style institutions. But the orientation does not distort assessments of where a country's labour institutions lie on a scale from primarily market-driven to primarily institution-driven (Chor and Freeman 2005) . Analysts who favour EU-style institutions can simply 'reverse code' the ratings so that instead of reporting that countries with an institutional bent rank low on a market-freedom scale, they can report that they rank high on an institution-oriented scale. 8
Column 2 of among all countries (Freeman and Oostendorp 2000) . Studies that examine particular economies over time find a similar pattern: when union density/collective bargaining coverage increases, inequality tends to fall, and when unionism/bargaining coverage falls, inequality increases (OECD 2011: Table 2 ). In its 2013 World Development Report, the World Bank summarizes its review of the evidence:
It is also clear that unions and collective bargaining have an equalizing effect on earnings distributions by compressing wage differentials.
Research has shown that wage inequality falls during periods when union density is increasing and rises when union membership is in decline Overall, Table 13 .2 shows that developing countries differ more from advanced countries in the three GCR indicators than in the Fraser Institute labour regulation index.
The traditional debate over labour policies--decentralized markets US-style versus collective bargaining and institutional interventions in the labour market EU-style--that the Fraser index measures does not capture the fact that developing countries differ most from advanced countries in a broader labour space that includes the operation of the higher educational system, the graduate job market, and openness to innovation.
[ Insert Table 13.3 about here] 3
Institutions and Outcomes
If the labour markets of advanced countries performed markedly better than those of developing countries, it might make sense for developing countries to seek to follow the models of the advanced countries even though the labour situation in developing countries differs greatly from that in the advanced countries. Among the advanced countries, many believed that the marketdominated labour system of the USA would fare better than the institution-driven labour markets of advanced Europe.
What happened was quite different. Employment proved to be more resilient in developing countries than in advanced countries. China recovered within a year and went on to experience rising wages and employment in 2010 and 2011. In Latin America employment fell less and recovered more quickly than in advanced OECD countries. One reason was that the informal labour markets in developing countries buffered job loss.
The ILO estimates that when the recession cut formal-sector employment from Q2 2008 to Q2 2009 in six Latin American countries, there was a near commensurate increase in informal-sector employment (ILO 2010: Figure 1.7) . Another reason was that Latin American GDP recovered quickly: in 2009 GDP per capita contracted by 2.9 per cent, but GDP per capita then increased by 4.2 per cent in 2010--a 7.1 percentage point turnaround. 9 Among advanced countries also, the responses to the recession and recovery differed from prior expectations. The USA shed jobs quickly, due to its flexible labour market, but restored jobs slowly in the ensuing recovery and experienced a substantial increase in the length of spells of joblessness. Denmark, whose widely heralded 'flexicurity' policy relied on flexible hiring and firing strategies, also had a disappointing employment recovery. By contrast, Germany's job-sharing policy maintained employment well, and other EU countries that relied extensively on institutions, such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden, also did well.
There are lessons for developing countries from the experiences of the advanced countries with different labour institutions, but the overall performance of advanced countries in the great recession and its aftermath does not suggest that those countries have the answers to the labour issues facing developing countries. On the notion that developing economies can learn more from their own experiences and the experiences of other developing countries than from the experiences of advanced countries, I consider next some of the policies that China adopted to deal with its labour problems, compare the world. Indeed, the number of strikes in China has grown so rapidly that a website now maps them across the country based on news articles and other reports. 13
The government's response to the perceived threat of inequality has been to: (i) strengthen the legal rights of informal workers; (ii) raise minimum wages and transfer payments, (iii) seek to transform the country's 'transmission belt' trade unions into something closer to a genuine representative of workers; and (iv) strengthen mediation and arbitration.
To help informal workers, China enacted a contract labour law that took effect on 1 January 2008. The law required that employers give migrant workers a written contract, which workers could take to court or arbitration committees to obtain their rights. Table 1 ). To increase earnings at the lower parts of the income distribution, Chinese provinces and municipalities raised minimum wages substantially in 2011. Over half of the 12 municipalities and provinces in China raised their minimum wages by over 20 per cent. The average minimum in the eastern and southern provinces exceeded 1,000 yuan. Zhejiang enacted a 1,310 yuan minimum, a 19 per cent increase over its 2010 level. Even Hong Kong, whose freemarket orientation has produced one of the least regulated labour markets in the world, introduced a minimum wage in 2011.
Researchers have not studied distributions of pay before and after the changes in the city or province minimum, nor examined whether increases in minimum wages spread from covered workers to others. It is clear, however, that workers are aware of the minimum wage in China. One contributing factor to the summer 2010 Honda strike was that the firm sought to evade an increased minimum in Foshan City by lowering meal and living subsidies by the same amount as the minimum wage increase.
Trade unions are the traditional labour institution through which workers defend their interests in market economies. China's official union organization, the ACFTU, nominally has more members than any other union federation in the world. But most workers do not view their workplace union as representing them. The ACFTU has operated as a Leninist 'transmission belt' organization that supports state policies and promotes workplace cooperation with management rather than acting as a defender of worker interests. It 'organizes' unions by asking management to set up a union in a plant.
If management accedes to the request it will often appoint a mid-level manager such as a human-resource executive as union leader. Indicative of this orientation, a senior ACFTU official seeking to unionize multinationals told executives that there was no reason to The workers did not accept the trade union as their representative . . . As the strike went on, the union wavered between management and the workers, and it saw itself as a mediator. Standing between the two sides is the worst position . . . In the labour conflicts at Honda's suppliers . . . in the Nansha district, our approach was very different and the trade union behaved proactively . . . we have educated the trade union cadres that they must represent the workers and not play the middleman. In the event of a strike, even very short ones, the trade unions have to be on the side of the workers. 15
In summer 2011, Hong-Kong-based Han Dongfang, the leading voice for independent unions in China, called on the international union movement to help the ACFTU reinvent itself as a genuine union: 15 Interview with Chen Weiguang, 27 October 2010.
Constructive engagement with the ACFTU at this point in history could produce real benefits . . . If the ACFTU can show it can better serve the party's interests (ensuring economic growth and social stability) by standing up for the rights and interests of workers, the party will certainly take note (cited in Guardian 2011). Finally, to help move China to the forefront of modern science and technology, China encourages the country's best and brightest to become international students. It awards scholarships for overseas studies, and seeks to gain top graduate students' admissions in leading overseas universities, despite the likelihood that many will settle in advanced countries. The existence of a substantial diaspora population creates an ethnic network through which information about modern technology and practices flows more quickly, thus benefiting the immigrants' home country.
Latin American Labour Policies
In the 1990s Latin America led the world in 'Washington Consensus' reforms to jump- But the market-oriented reforms did not deliver on their promise of better functioning economies. Latin American economies that adopted the market reforms did not experience any spurt in economic growth. Argentina, which had high unemployment and rising inequality even as its GDP grew in the early and mid-1990s, fell into recession in 1999. The 2002 collapse of the Argentine peso put the finishing touches on the failed Washington Consensus model of growth (Hornbeck 2002 Over the same period, Brazil's economy boomed and the share of the workforce in the informal sector declined by 6 to 10 percentage points (as indicated in Table 13 .1). 18
Brazil increased its spending on enforcing labour regulations, with discernible effects on the level and location of employment and wages (Almeida and Carneiro 2007) . It instituted policies that promoted formalization beyond the flow of informal-sector workers to the formal sector in economic booms. To improve the incentives for small firms and micro-enterprises to formalize, the government enacted the SIMPLES law that exempted small firms from taxes and made it less costly for them to formalize. It also gave labour inspectors incentives to register informal workers and to help firms deal with the problems that might arise from formalization (Pires 2008 ).
Towards New Labour Institutions and Policies
China and the Latin American countries have to overcome similar problems to grow their economies for the benefit of the bulk of the population. They have to find ways to improve the economic wellbeing of informal-sector workers, to reduce or at least arrest the growth of income inequality, and to balance the increased supply of university graduates with the development of knowledge-based industries. 18 Berg (2011: 7-8 and Figure 2 ). What at first look seems to be the biggest difference between the efforts of China and Latin America to improve the incomes of workers is that China seeks to empower workers and unions whereas Brazil and other Latin American countries rely more on state initiatives, such as Brazil deploying its labour inspectorate to encourage firms to move into the formal sector and giving firms tax incentives to do so (Almeida and Carneiro 2011) . Brazil has also built up knowledge of how to manage the inspectorate to carry out their jobs (Pires 2011) . But this difference is less striking in the light of China's official unions being part of the government/party apparatus. China's union cadres are more like labour inspectorate officials than independent representatives of workers.
China's decision to empower workers and strengthen collective bargaining may seem paradoxical given the role of the communist party and government in China's version of state capitalism (Economist 2012). It reflects the division of power and incentives between a central government committed to reduce inequality and local authorities committed to expanding local business. It also reflects a belief that relying on workers and unions to defend worker rights strengthens social stability by channelling discontent to the private market rather than towards the state. This in turn allows the government to play the mediating role.
One other difference between the policies of China and Latin America deserves attention. China has been far bolder in building up its university graduate workforce and investing in R&D than has any Latin American country. Along with its policy of increasing the supply of university students, China raised R&D spending in the 2000s so rapidly that it became the second largest investor in R&D in the world (the USA being the lead country). China's R&D to GDP ratio increased to nearly twice that of Brazil, Latin America's leader in R&D (NSF 2012: Table 4 .19).
Latin American analysts and decision-makers have much to learn from China's effort to give workers the legal status and tools to defend their rights, particularly in light of modern information and communication technology, its efforts to build up collective bargaining, and its investments in higher education and R&D. China has much to learn from the Latin American experience with formal labour inspectorates enforcing labour regulations and the informal El Farol spreading the effects of minimum wages. Paying increasing attention to the institutions and policies of the other is likely, in my view, to
give each a higher pay-off in knowledge about ways to improve labour policies than each continuing to look primarily at what the advanced countries are doing in their labour markets. 
